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  A canvass of the resource economics literature of the last thirty years yields only a small 
number of applications of economic theory to the problems of recreational fishing, especially 
compared to the large number of contributions to commercial fisheries over this same era.
1  
McConnell and Sutinen (1979) pioneered the application of bioeconomic models in the 
recreational context with a simple model in which angler demand was solely a function of the 
quantity of trips and the harvest per trip .  They show the existence of a stock externality in free 
competition relative to the optimally managed system.  Anderson (1993) expands upon this 
framework by endogenizing the discard decisions of anglers and incorporating a mechanism for 
entry and exit of potentially heterogeneous fishery participants.  Bishop and Samples (1980) 
consider the issue of allocation of species that are shared between commercial and recreational 
fisheries.  Homans and Ruliffson (1997) examine the implications of minimum size limits for 
achieving management goals and improving fishing quality while Woodward and Griffin (2003) 
take this analysis still further by considering the joint use of size and bag limits. 
  This neglect may be linked to the relatively short shrift given to the control of 
recreational fisheries by fisheries managers in the past.  Recreational fisheries for many species 
have historically gone largely unchecked while commercial fleets targeting the same species (for 
instance, the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery) have seen their ability to harvest the same 
species dramatically curtailed.  This asymmetry may be justified when recreational takes are 
                                                 
1 By contrast, the empirical economic literature on recreational fisheries is far too extensive to fully catalogue here 
(c.f. Bockstael, et al. (1989), Criddle, et al. (2003), Gillig, et al. (2000, 2003), Haab, et al. (2000), Lee (2000)).  
However, this literature has shared the focus of the broader recreation valuation literature (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005) 
by focusing on welfare estimates of regional fisheries or the welfare impacts of changes in natural amenities.  
Relatively little focus has been placed upon the empirical assessment of rent dissipation in open access systems or 
the predictive modeling of demand in response to regulation, a notable exception being Scrogin, et al. (2004).  
  1sufficiently small to be negligible for the purposes of stock management.   However, it has 
become increasingly clear that recreational fish mortality, far from being insignificant, is often 
comparable to or greater than the commercial mortality for many species.
2  With fisheries 
managers scrambling to find solutions for the effective control of recreational mortality, 
economists have entered the policy arena promoting innovative rights-based policy prescriptions 
that are grounded in the past successes of economic prescriptions for the management of 
commercial fisheries but with allowances for the unique informational and transactions costs 
associated with the recreational case (Johnston, et al., 2007, Sutinen and Johnston, 2003).     
  Despite the possible merits of these proposals, there is nevertheless a sense that they may 
not be as immediately transferable to recreational settings as initially imagined.  In the first 
place, our understanding of the mechanisms of the rent dissipation process under open access is 
imperfect at best.  Experience from the rationalization of commercial fisheries has yielded many 
surprises that demonstrate the inadequacies of simple single-factor (i.e. effort) models in 
capturing the complexities of real-world rent dissipation (Wilen, 2005).  Second, while the 
recreational for-hire sector may seem similar to commercial fisheries operations in many ways, 
there are key differences that may limit the simple transfer of knowledge and experience from 
commercial rationalization programs.  These observations point toward the need for a more 
specialized theoretical foundation in order to predict the likely impacts of recreational fishery 
rationalization programs.     
                                                 
2 A recent study suggests that 23% of the landings of “populations of concern” (those that are either overfished or 
experiencing overfishing) are accounted for by recreational harvest (Coleman, et al., 2004).  This proportion exhibits 
significant regional variation – rising to 64% in the Gulf of Mexico.   
  2  As a first step along this path, we develop a bioeconomic model of optimal and open 
access management for a for-hire recreational fishery.
3  We restrict our attention to the for-hire 
sector for three reasons.  First, charter and headboat trips are a substantial part of total fishing 
effort for many species and often contribute in a significant way to many coastal economies.  
Second, given the relative ease of observing fishing activities on for-hire vessels compared to 
solitary fishing trips (due to their limited and known ports of origin and the clustering of multiple 
anglers on a single vessel), they are widely considered as easier targets for regulation and are 
thus likely to be of some importance in recreational fisheries policy making over the near 
horizon.  Finally, as we shall demonstrate, the interaction of consumer preferences with the 
supply behavior of vessel owners creates the potential for an array of fascinating distortions and 
feedbacks with great relevance for fisheries policy.   
  Our model rests upon elements of the bioeconomic framework pioneered by McConnell 
and Sutinen (1979) and Anderson (1993).  However, their models focus on recreational demand 
whereas our model incorporates a realistic and flexible theory of the choice of inputs of the for-
hire fishing firm.  This synthesis of traditional bioeconomics with a production economics 
treatment of firm behavior is unique, both in commercial and recreational fisheries applications.   
Combining the supply and demand sides of the problem is necessary in order to examine the long 
run distortions arising under open access in a manner that reflects feedbacks between angler 
preferences and the decisions of vessel owners.
4  Understanding these distortions, in turn, allows 
                                                 
3 The for-hire sector is composed of both charter and headboat vessels.  A charter vessel is defined as a vessel for 
which a group of anglers pays a fixed rate for the exclusive use of the vessel for a trip whereas a headboat charges 
anglers individually for seats on the vessel.  Our model applies to both types although we couch our analysis in 
terms of headboats.     
4 Huang and Lee (1976) develop a more general model of commercial fishery production in a bioeconomic context 
but do not apply their framework.  Empirical production economists have criticized the classic bioeconomic model 
(Squires, 1987) but their has been no attempt, to the authors’ knowledge, to reconcile the dynamic insights of the 
bioeconomic framework with the more realistic portrayals of fishing technology offered by production economists.    
  3us to characterize the kinds of changes across different margins that would occur under various 
rationalization designs.   
  The second section of this paper describes the framework of our model and characterizes 
the optimally managed system.  Section three contrasts these results with those obtained under an 
open access system.  The fourth section addresses how the distortions of the previous section can 
be theoretically addressed through judicious choice of tax or quota instruments.  The fifth section 
discusses the robustness of these suggested policy instruments to violations of our modeling 
assumptions and considers some real-world concerns for the “rationalization” of for-hire 
recreational fisheries.  The sixth section concludes the analysis.                  
  
II. A Theory of For-Hire Recreational Fishing Under Optimal Management 
We begin by assuming that vessel owners supply fishing trips of a fixed and exogenous 
length – say a day.
5  We assume that there is a population of identical anglers whose aggregated 
preferences for day trips on charter or headboat vessels conditional on their various quality 
attributes are encompassed by a marginal benefit function:  where D is the 
number of angler-days of for-hire services demanded over the fishing season, H is the per-
angler-day harvest of targeted fish, L is the amount of this daily harvest that is retained by 
anglers for landing, and S is a measure of fishing trip quality that is orthogonal with respect to 
the quantity or disposition of catch.
) , , , ( S L H D MB
6     
                                                 
5 This is a convenient simplification despite the real-world differentiation of charter/headboat trips into at least two 
durations, half-day and day trips (with a few vessels offering overnight trips).  This being said, day trips are by far 
the most common offering, particularly along the Gulf Coast (Sutton, et al., 1999).   
6 Although not explicitly included in our specification, demand is also influenced by other factors such as the prices 
of substitute recreation possibilities (e.g. the cost of fishing dockside without chartering a vessel) and prices of 
complementary goods.    
  4Note that anglers’ marginal willingness-to-pay for a day at sea is not only dependent 
upon the quantity of charter services previously consumed, but also upon the quality of these 
services.  Quality may be a function of the daily catch rate, the chosen or imposed quantity of 
landings, and the non-catch aspects of trip quality, which include aspects of the trip such as the 
perceived safety and general upkeep of the vessel and the devotion of labor time toward non-
catch related activities that enhance the experience of fishing (such as serving food or drink to 
passengers or filleting catch).
7  This formulation mimics that of previous authors (c.f. Anderson, 
1993, Woodward and Griffin, 2003) who have posited that both catch and landings are important 
determinants of angler demand, but also embraces the findings of a wider social science 
literature that finds non-catch aspects figure significantly as well (Arlinghaus, 2006, Ditton and 
Gill, 1991, Fedler and Ditton, 1986).  We assume the marginal benefit function is continuous and 
twice-differentiable with respect to all variables and satisfies the following properties:  
  L S H j MB S H D MB MB MB MB jj L S H D , , 0 , 0 ) , 0 , , ( , 0 , 0 , 0 = < > > > <   (1)
where subscripts indicate the first partial derivative with respect to the subscripted variable.  The 
first condition simply assumes the demand function for charter trips is downward sloping 
whereas the second and third state that the marginal willingness-to-pay for another day of fishing 
is strictly increasing in the quality aspects of the trip.  We do relax these assumptions for the 
effects of landings, however, since it is plausible that, conditional upon the quantity of catch, 
individuals may face satiation.  Accordingly, we make the minimal assumption that positive 
landings are a good for at least the first marginal unit of consumption.
8  The final condition 
                                                 
7 Our assumption of identical preferences over catch, landings and non-catch quality can be easily relaxed by the 
introduction of a range of demand functions for various angler “types”.   
8 This assumption precludes preferences for pure catch and release fishing.  In this case, consumptive use of catch is 
no longer a good and so landings would fall out of the model.   
  5simply imposes diminishing marginal returns on increases in harvest, landings and non-catch 
quality.
9     
  As previously mentioned, the catch and non-catch aspects of trip quality are produced 
with multiple compensated and uncompensated factors of production.  In the case of per-trip 
harvest, we assume that it is a continuous, differentiable and increasing function of the current 
stock of the target species, X, and a “catch effectiveness” argument, q, analogous to the 
catchability term commonly employed for analysis of commercial fisheries.  Catch effectiveness 
is itself a function of a Qx1 vector of capital and labor inputs selected by the vessel owner, , 
that serve to enhance the skill of fishermen.
q z
10  For instance   may include the use of additional 
fishing rods for each angler to increase catch per unit effort, investment in engine horsepower to 
allow faster access to productive fishing grounds and greater fishing time, the use of chum to 
attract certain species, or the diversion of crew time to education on fishing techniques and the 
baiting of gear.  In agreement with conventional production theory, we assume that each of these 
inputs has a positive and diminishing marginal effect on catch effectiveness.   
q z
In addition to these purchased factors, we also assume that the number of anglers onboard 
a given vessel, N, has a negative, continuous, differentiable and decreasing effect on the marginal 
effectiveness of effort – this to account in a generic fashion for a variety of possible intra-vessel 
congestion externalities (e.g. from entangled fishing lines).  The mathematical summary of these 
properties of the catch quality production function,  , are summarized as follows:   )) , ( , ( N z q X H q
                                                 
9 Given our focus on aggregated demand, we do not entertain the possibility of “corner solutions” in demand (i.e. 
individual non-participation).  Anderson (1993) exposits a model where free entry of anglers combined with 
heterogeneity yields an equilibrium where fishing benefits to anglers are dissipated, much as in the classical 
commercial fisheries model thus leading to partial exit of some anglers.  While useful, this approach seems to lack a 
firm basis in consumer theory and also begs the question of what economic mechanism (if any) would guide angler 
demand so that some common minimal level of well-being is achieved across anglers in equilibrium.   
10 To simplify the formal analysis, we presume fishermen are equally skilled and that their per-trip catch is 
predetermined from their perspective.  The implications of relaxing these assumptions are considered in the later 
discussion.     

































  Non-catch quality is similarly dependent upon a Mx1 vector of inputs,  , which is 
subject to the same continuity, differentiability and concavity restrictions as previously stated for 
catch quality inputs.  However, to account for the fact that some inputs that aid in the production 
of catch quality may actually reduce productive capacity for non-catch quality (and vice versa) 
we allow both “goods” and “bads” in the production relationship with sufficient curvature 
restrictions to ensure the overall concavity of the marginal benefit function with respect to all 
benefits.  Note that all inputs are defined so that they are positive contributors to catch quality 
production.  As with catch quality, we assume that non-catch quality is influenced by the number 
of passengers onboard a vessel in a negative and decreasing fashion so as to reflect negative 
attitudes toward crowding apart from its impacts on catch.
s z
11   

























                                                 
11 Although convenient, such an assumption may not be true in general.  Individuals may initially derive utility from 
the company of fellow anglers (apart from their effects on catch) with diminishing returns eventually leading to a 
threshold density where the marginal effect of an additional angler on the production of non-catch quality becomes 
negative.  For the sake of mathematical tractability we assume that these preferences for “social” fishing are 
sufficiently weak or exhibited at such low angler densities as to be negligible. 
12 In our specification of the production processes of catch and non-catch quality we have assumed that the two 
processes are separable and thus represented by production functions.  In reality, however, there may be significant 
jointness in production.  We confront this issue in two ways.  First, certain inputs are likely to contribute to the 
production of both forms of quality in a completely non-rivalrous fashion, such that their appearance in both 
production processes causes no problem.  This is potentially the case for many characteristics of vessel capital such 
as deck size for which its usefulness in fostering catch (due to the dilution of congestion effects) is likely to in no 
way affect its contribution toward perceptions of non-catch quality.  Secondly, for inputs that are clearly rivalrously 
consumed, a non-rivalrous relationship can be constructed by careful redefinition of inputs.  For instance, labor 
inputs that can be utilized for either fostering catch or non-catch quality (but not both simultaneously) can be 
redefined as “catch related labor” and “non-catch related labor”, thus subsuming the factor allocation decision 
within our analysis. 
  7  Given this structure of preferences and production relationships, we now consider the 
nature of costs to vessel owners.  We assume that there is an endogenously determined number 
of identical vessels .  Each of these vessels faces three basic types of costs: 1) those that vary 
according to the number of trips, 2) avoidable fixed costs (costs that are invariant in the number 
of trips but are nevertheless avoidable without quitting the industry) and 3) fixed costs that are 
only avoidable by exiting the industry altogether (e.g. license fees, minimal vessel insurance, 
etc.) which we henceforth designate by
V N
Ψ .  The first category may include expenditures such as 
labor and fuel while the second includes expenditures on capital inputs.
13  Note that inputs in 
each category can enter into the production functions for both catch and non-catch quality in a 
completely unfettered fashion.   
  Since part of our focus in this analysis is to investigate the use of inputs under optimal 
and open access scenarios, we work with the seasonal vessel expenditure function rather than the 
cost function resulting from quality-constrained expenditure minimization:  
 
[ ]
[] . ) ' ( ) ' (
' ) ' ( ) , , , , , (
Ψ + + +
∗ + =
F F FN FN
V V VN VN s q
z r N z r
NumTrips z w N z w r w NumTrips N z z c
  (4)  
Note that seasonal costs are a function not only of inputs and their exogenous market prices 
(indicated by the vectors w and r for variable and fixed inputs, respectively) but also of the 
number of trips taken in the season and the number of anglers per trip.
14  Both the fixed and trip-
variable cost components are partially comprised of costs that vary in a linear fashion with the 
number of passengers.  For instance, a vessel owner may elect to allocate a given number of 
                                                 
13 Since many aspects of vessel capital are best characterized as heterogeneous bundles of valued characteristics (e.g. 
horsepower, fuel capacity, length, tonnage) we adopt the language of hedonic pricing in our descriptions of capital 
inputs.  Accordingly, the rental rates for a characteristic are interpreted as the first derivatives of the bid function 
with respect to the quantity of that characteristic (Rosen, 1974).        
14 We assume trips are reproducible at a constant variable cost when inputs and the numbers of passengers per trip 
are fixed.  In the context of day-trips it seems eminently reasonable that the variable cost of taking a trip today 
should be independent of whether a trip was executed on the previous day.     
  8fishing rods per angler.  Such capital expenditures would be reflected in the vector  .  
Alternatively, crew time spent in training and baiting gear for each passenger could be captured 
in the  term.  Finally, it may be that certain inputs enter both the portion of costs increasing in 
N and the portion without.  For instance, the fuel costs associated with traveling a given distance 
from port (the endogenous variable input) could be parsed between the costs associated with a 
boat devoid of anglers and the extra per-angler costs due to increased payload.
FN z
VN z
15    
  Having established the nature of both costs and benefits, we now require an expression 
linking the behavior of anglers and vessel owners to the evolution of targeted biomass through 
time.  We employ the following standard relationship:  
  ( ) ( ) L L N z q X H D X g X q + − − = )) , ( , ( ) (
* φ &   (5)
where   is the total number of fishing days demanded and 
* D φ  is a discard mortality parameter 
indicating the fraction of discarded catch that dies before returning to the reproductive stock.  
The growth function   is assumed to be strictly concave and to prescribe zero growth at zero 
biomass and at a positive carrying capacity. 
) (X g




























subject to (5), non-negativity constraints on the state and control variables and the following 
additional constraints:  
                                                 
15 Note that the linearity of the expenditure function with respect to N does not mean that optimized costs possess a 
linear-in-N relationship.   Given the endogeneity of both the number of passengers per trip and all inputs, it is 
possible for the allocation of inputs to vary as N varies – leading to a non-linear relationship in minimized costs.   
  9  ()
N N
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The first constraint simply limits landings to an amount weakly less than individual harvest.
16  
The second constraint states that the number of trips taken by a vessel must not exceed the total 
number of available opportunities in a season,  .  Note, however, that NumTrips is not 
included as a separate control variable in our statement of the problem.  The rationale is found in 
the third constraint of (7).  We assume, given the homogeneity of vessels in our model, that both 
passengers and trips are spread evenly across the fleet.    Combining this assumption with the 
endogenously determined number of vessels and anglers per trip (and the constant variable cost 
of trips by a vessel) yields the per-vessel trip count indicated in (7). 
MAX D
  The task of the social planner is to choose the time paths of fishing days, landings, angler 
density, the number of vessels and vessel inputs so as to maximize the discounted present value 
of the flow of net benefits.  The constrained current value Hamiltonian, where we have 
substituted for the third constraint from (7), is:  
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A glance at (4) and (8) reveals that the Hamiltonian (excepting the constraints) is linear 
in .  This linearity is particularly simple in that it plays no role in the equation of motion and 
only affects net benefits through a positive effect on fixed costs.  The implication of this linearity 
V N
                                                 
16 In reality individual landings may exceed individual harvest if fishermen are able to trade their catch with other 
passengers.  In this case, the constraint could be modified to apply to the sum of individual landings and harvest.  
However, given our current assumption of identical preferences and skill across anglers (and non-stochastic catch), 
the individual and aggregate constraints are equivalent.   
  10is that each vessel must be fully employed in every season for social welfare to be maximized.  
In other words, the second constraint in (7) must strictly bind.
17  Given that the second constraint 
in (7) must bind, a generalized version of the maximum principle (c.f. Caputo, 2005, p. 152) 
states that the necessary condition for the path of   through time can be found by taking the 
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Note the fundamental role of fixed costs in determining the optimum scale of the industry – the 
higher are fixed costs the lower the optimal number of vessels.  Since fixed costs are increasing 
in the number of passengers, it is also the case that an increase in the optimum angler density 
will lead to a decrease in the number of vessels.  Also, the longer the natural season, the greater 
the number of vessels since the fixed operating costs can be spread over a larger number of trips.  
Finally, the number of vessels is rising in the marginal valuation of an additional day for the 
entire fleet.   
The necessary condition for the number of fishing days is:  
  () () []
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17 The proof for this assertion is intuitive and is easily arrived at by contradiction.  Assume vessels are not fully 
employed.  This would imply that angler demand could be diverted to a smaller number of vessels while maintaining 
the same angler density per trip.  Benefits to consumers would remain constant while expenditures on variable costs 
would also remain the same due to the linearity of expenditures in the number of trips.  However, fixed costs would 
decrease in this new state of affairs given the retirement of redundant vessel capital.  Therefore it follows that any 
non-full-employment outcome is suboptimal.  This result is an artifact of the lack of any adjustment costs of 
entry/exit in our model as well as the constant variable cost of trips.  However, given our ultimate concern for long-
run bioeconomic equilibria, the omission of adjustment costs is immaterial since excess capacity cannot persist 
indefinitely with finite costs of adjustment. 
  11At an interior solution this condition states that the net marginal benefits from an additional 
angler-day (the increase in angler welfare minus the increase in variable costs as the fleet-wide 
number of trips is increased to accommodate the extra demand) are just offset at each point in 
time by the discounted capital value of the induced mortality.  However, as broached in the 
previous paragraph, such an interior solution does not exist given the necessity of full vessel 
employment at the optimal solution.  An increase in angler days at sea at a fixed angler density 
thus necessitates an increase in the number of vessels and an associated increase in fixed costs.  
This is easily demonstrated by simple rearrangement of (9) for 2 μ : 
  () Ψ + + = F F FN FN
MAX
V z r N z r
D
N
' ) ' ( 2 μ .  (11)
The benefit of an additional day of available fishing time is simply the value of the reduction in 
vessel capital (i.e. the reduction in fixed costs) required to service demand at current angler 
densities.  Therefore the third term in (10) reflects the industry-wide increase in fixed costs from 
the new vessel capital needed to service an extra angler day within the constraints of available 
fishing time provided that extra angler day were spread over all vessels equally (i.e. in a cost 
minimizing fashion) holding angler density constant.     
The necessary condition for angler landings is:  





φ λ μ − = − ⋅ ∫ D dD MB
D
L   (12)
This condition simply implies that the net marginal benefits of additional landings must be offset 
by the full dynamic costs of the extra mortality from doing so.  Note that if discards experience 
full mortality ( 1 = φ ) then there is no dynamic consequence to the allocation of catch between 
landings and discards and (12) becomes a static condition.  It is possible, however, that catch is 
  12insufficient to satiate anglers’ consumptive desires, in which case the entirety of harvest is 
landed and  0 1 > μ .   
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Note that the dynamic effect of an increase in angler density, the right hand side of (14), is 
negative, implying a benefit from an increase in angler density due to its adverse effect on an 
angler’s harvest efficiency and thus fishing mortality.  This implies that intra-vessel congestion 
should be driven beyond the point where the short run return to society is maximized.  The short 
run marginal return (the left hand side of (14)) is intricate and can be examined piece by piece.  
The first term is always negative, reflecting detriments to angler utility from the effects of 
congestion.  The cost effects of increased angler density consist of the reduction in variable costs 
due to a decrease in the overall number of trips required to service demand and a reduction in 
fixed costs (both avoidable and unavoidable) due to the reduction in vessel capital needed to 
satisfy demand while maintaining full employment for each vessel.     
  13  In the event that landings are constrained by harvest (i.e. 0 1 > μ ) there is an additional 
near-term cost of increasing angler density in that it reduces angler welfare due to reduced 
landings.  This drives the optimal solution toward a lower density of anglers.  In other words, 
ceteris paribus, a fishery with strong retention preferences (high quality food fish species) should 
have lower optimal levels of angler congestion than a technologically equivalent fishery 
characterized by weak retention preferences (e.g. tarpon or marlin).   
  In considering the necessary conditions for the choice of inputs, there are several stylized 
sub-cases to examine.  An input can affect either catch or non-catch quality (or both) and can be 
a fixed or variable input and vary with the choice of N (or not).  We work at the maximum level 
of generality, assuming that the input affects both catch and non-catch quality and that the factor 
has both N-varying and non N-varying aspects.  For the case of a fixed input at an interior 
solution:  
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The current net marginal benefits from an increase in an input must be balanced against the 
dynamic costs of the mortality due to increased catch effectiveness.
18  Additionally, if landings 
are constrained by harvest ( 0 1 > μ ), then there is a further benefit to increasing factors that 
influence catch quality as doing so also increases landings.
19   
  The necessary conditions for variable factors are as follows:  
                                                 
18 To ensure such interior solutions for all factors, we must supplement the properties of the catch and non-catch 
quality production functions (given by (2) and (3)) with additional “Inada conditions” that all inputs are essential 
and have an infinite marginal product as the quantity of the input approaches zero.    
19 The corollary to this statement is that vessels pursuing species for which preferences for landings are strong 
relative to the baseline “catchability” should optimally evidence a higher degree of catch-augmenting capital/labor 
investment compared to fisheries with similar natural catchability but weak preferences for landings.   
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with a virtually identical interpretation to those for fixed factors.  Factoring of this condition 
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This equation closely resembles the standard profit maximization condition that the value of the 
marginal product of an input be equated to the marginal factor price, but with three key 
differences.  First, our model works at the scale of the regional industry so that prices of outputs 
are not exogenous to the social planner maker.  Second, the production processes under 
consideration are for the production of catch and non-catch quality at a given (but endogenous) 
level of trips so that benefits of quality change are measured with respect to shifts in the 
consumer demand function.  Finally,  and   represent the optimal “prices” of catch and non-





  Calculating (17) for another variable factor j and forming the ratio of these conditions 
yields the following expression:  
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If inputs are exclusive contributors to either catch or non-catch quality, this equation reduces to 
the standard cost-minimizing tangency condition between the expenditure frontier and the 
marginal rate of technical substitution.  More generally, (18) is identical in form to the condition 
  15generated by a cost minimization problem subject to dual quality constraints with non-rivalrous 
inputs – only here the optimal prices of quality replace the usual Lagrange multipliers.  This 
finding reflects how the family of conditions embodied in (16) jointly determines both the 
optimal quality levels and the cost-minimizing input combinations.  Equation (18) shows that the 
relative combination of inputs is product of a mixture of two single-quality tangency conditions 
where the relative influence of catch or non-catch quality in influencing the mix of inputs is a 
product of their optimal marginal valuations.
20   
  The costate equation for the dynamic optimization problem is:  
  () ∫ − ′ − ⋅ − = −
*
0
* ) ( ) (
D
X X H H D X g dD H MB φ λ δλ λ & . (19)
Considering this equation at the steady state ( ) yields the following solution for the costate 
variable:  
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where for the sake of economy of notation it is understood that all control and state variables are 
evaluated at their steady state levels.  Several observations are warranted here.  First, the capital 
value of the fish stock is, predictably, inversely related to the discount rate of the social planner.  
Second, if harvest rates have no impact on marginal benefits ( 0 = H MB ) or if increases in fish 
stock stock density have negligible effects on catch rates ( 0 = X H ) then an extra unit of stock 
has no long run value and the user cost is zero.  Third, the effect of a higher mortality rate of 
discards is to decrease the steady-state valuation of the fish stock due to the anticipated leakage 
                                                 
20 We should note that analogous expressions to (17) and (18) can be derived for fixed inputs (and ratios of fixed and 
variable inputs) as well.   
  16of fish capital from the system via the discard process.
21  Finally, the effect of increased angler 
demand on the valuation of the stock is ambiguous, depending upon the sign and magnitude of 
the derivative of the biological growth rate. 
  Having derived the necessary conditions for the optimal management of the fishery, we 
now contrast them with what we would expect in a perfectly competitive open access industry.   
 
III. The Open Access Outcome 
  In competitive equilibrium the market determines the number of fishing days and 
landings (holding other variables fixed) so as to maximize the sum of short-run consumer and 
producer surplus: 
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subject to the aforementioned constraints on landings and the maximum number of trips per 
vessel where the vessels’ choice of angler density, number of vessels and quality inputs are taken 
as given by anglers.  The first order condition for   is as follows: 
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This expression differs from (10) in that the full user cost of the mortality from additional angler-
days is missing from the right hand side.  As a result, there will be excessive demand for days at 
sea by anglers in the competitive case relative to the social optimum.
22   
  The analogous condition for L is:  
                                                 
21 The effect of the mortality parameter in our model on the costate variable is analogous (although not perfectly 
equivalent) to the role of depreciation in the literature on investment.   
22 In the event that vessels are fully employed in a competitive equilibrium (an unlikely event as we will later 
demonstrate), a fisherman desiring an extra day at sea would have to pay a discretely higher price than those 
immediately preceding him due to the necessity of covering the fixed costs of the marginal increase in vessel capital 
required to satisfy demand – thus the final term in (22).   
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Note that landings are determined without regard to the effects of the extra mortality on the 
future stock.  Anglers either reach a satiation point in their consumptive use or are limited in 
their landings by the quantity of harvest.  Therefore, the incentive to discard is excessive in a 
purely competitive system compared to the optimal situation in (12).  The only exception occurs 
when there is full mortality of discards.  In this case, all harvest is lost to the system regardless of 
whether it is retained and so landings decisions have no dynamic impact.
23   
  The number of passengers per vessel and the factors of production are chosen by vessel 
owners and are driven to equilibrium values through competition in the market for fishing trips.  
We make no attempt to rigorously characterize the dynamic process by which such an 
equilibrium is achieved, choosing instead to focus on the properties of the equilibrium itself.
24    
  Given that angler density influences angler perceptions of quality, vessel owners will 
seek to differentiate their services by altering the concentration of anglers on their vessel.  Of 
course, we would expect this vessel’s competitors to respond in kind, leading to an iterative 
process of quality competition.  The competitive market equilibrium arising as the limit of this 










if 0 2 > μ ):      
                                                 
23 This finding that atomistic discard decisions may be socially optimal parallels the findings of Arnason (1994) in 
the commercial case. 
24 A fully developed dynamic explanation of the path to equilibrium would likely entail the consideration of the 
adjustment costs of investment in fixed factors and partial irreversibility of such investments (c.f. Clark, et al. (1979) 
and Gould (1968)). 
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In the case where landings are unconstrained, this condition says that quality competition will 
drive angler density down to the point where the foregone increases in angler benefits and 
reduced N-variable fixed costs from a reduction in density are just offset by the marginal costs of 
doing so, where these extra costs are incurred through an increase in the number of trips 
necessary to serve the available demand.  In the event that landings are constrained by harvest, 
then a full accounting of the exploitable marginal benefits (i.e. the full marginal willingness to 
pay of anglers) of a decrease in density requires the third term in (24) to account for the value of 
increased landings.  A comparison of (24) to (13) reveals that the competitive equilibrium once 
again fails to account for the dynamic implications of the choice variable.  In this case a decrease 
in N imparts a long-run cost due to its accelerating effect on per-angler mortality – the 
implication being that the incentive in competitive equilibrium is toward a smaller number of 
anglers per vessel than is optimal.  This result is particularly telling given the prevailing wisdom 
that open access competition encourages excessive congestion in commercial fisheries.  This may 
be true for inter-vessel congestion (an arguably small effect for many recreational fisheries), but 
here congestion is assumed intra-vessel and consumer preferences for congestion avoidance are 
relayed to vessel owners through market demand, driving this surprising result.
25   
                                                 
25 Note that an extra cost of further lowering of N is revealed in (24) if the season limit constraint is binding on 
vessels in competitive equilibrium.  This cost arises due to fixed costs from the increased vessel capital needed to 
service the surplus trip demand released by the lower angler density.     
  19  The determination of quality-augmenting inputs under competition is explainable via a 
similar sequential argument as made for angler density.  The marginal condition that is satisfied 
in competitive equilibrium for variable factors is:  
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This condition is identical to that in (16) except for the now predictable result that decision 
making under unfettered competition fails to account for future mortality effects.  Factoring (25) 
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Note that the valuation of the marginal contribution of catch effectiveness to the “value of 
marginal product” is overstated relative to the optimal case ( ).  The cost minimization 
tangency condition in (16) continues to hold, only now the relative preference given to catch 
quality in the quantity and composition of inputs is skewed toward excessive catch quality.  In 
other words, equilibrium catch effectiveness will be too high under pure open access competition 
and some of the inputs that play a role in its production will see excessive use, notwithstanding 
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  We now flesh out this insight for a couple of simple cases.  First, consider the case where 
catch quality is a function of a single exclusive input.  If we take the ratio of conditions (17) and 
(26) we find:  

















given the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity of inputs.  Note, however, that this 
increase in catch augmenting factors is not guaranteed to occur in general.  When there are 
multiple catch-quality-exclusive inputs, the move from optimal management to competition may 
result in less of some inputs and more of others depending upon the nature of the catch quality 
production function.
26  Nonetheless, this combination of inputs must generate a higher level of 
catch quality than before such that the use of at least one input must exceed its level under 
optimal management.   
  In the case where an input affects non-catch quality exclusively a comparison of (26) to 
(17) reveals that the valuation of non-catch quality under competition and optimal management 
is identical.  There is, therefore, no direct incentive for the distorted use of this input.  However, 
indirect distortions may propagate due to possible substitution effects between catch and non-
catch quality in angler demand.  For instance, if the two components of quality are substitutes 
then the presence of excessive catch quality in pure competition will weaken demand for non-
catch quality, lowering its equilibrium value and thus causing the use of at least one of its 
exclusive inputs to fall relative to the optimal input bundle.   
  In the case where some inputs contribute to both catch and non-catch quality, the 
situation is much more complicated.  In the case of non-catch quality, there may be a tendency to 
substitute away from exclusive inputs and towards inputs that pay a “double dividend” by 
contributing positively toward catch quality.
27  This substitution is driven by the excessive price 
                                                 
26 A sufficient (although not necessary) condition for expansion of all exclusive catch quality inputs is homotheticity 
of the quality production function.    
27 A corollary to this statement is that there will be a tendency to over-invest in catch-influencing inputs that act as 
“bads” in the production of non-catch quality, particularly if the two quality metrics are highly substitutable to 
  21signal sent by the market for catch quality under perfect competition.  The degree to which such 
behavior is evidenced in practice depends a great deal on the degree to which shared versus 
exclusive inputs are substitutable in consumer’s perceptions of non-catch quality, the relative 
prices of these classes of inputs and the magnitude of the rift between the optimal and 
competitive “price” of catch quality.       
  These cases are indicative of a labyrinthine and theoretically ambiguous relationship 
between the distortions in the valuation of catch quality and potential feedback effects for 
equilibrium non-catch quality.  Outcomes depend on a number of factors involving the degree of 
cost complementarities between the two forms of quality (which depends in turn on the nature 
and importance of shared inputs in their joint production) and the degree of substitutability of 
catch and non-catch quality in trip demand. 
  The determination of the number of vessels in long-run competitive equilibrium is 
characterized by the elimination of all supranormal rents from the system.  Mathematically:  
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Assume that the optimally managed steady state would generate positive rents to the industry and 
now consider the “deregulation” of the system.  Since anglers are no longer paying the implicit 
dynamic cost of their fishing-induced mortality, the number of trips demanded increases.  
Furthermore, the demand curve is shifted outward due to additional incentives on the part of 
vessel owners to compete along margins of catch quality.  Given that each vessel under optimal 
management was operating at full seasonal capacity, it follows that the number of vessels in the 
fishery must increase under the competitive open access scenario.  Fixed costs, downward 
                                                                                                                                                             
consumers and these inputs are not easily substituted for in the production of catch quality.  For instance, vessels 
may over-invest in noisy but powerful engines in order to increase fishing time.  This would likely increase catch 
quality but diminish the aesthetics of the trip in a way that reduces angler welfare.       
 
  22sloping demand and diminishing returns to increases in quality inputs eventually exhaust excess 
rents, however, and entry stops when the headboat trip price (the equilibrium price per angler-
day) equals the average total cost per angler-day.
28  Note that there is no inherent mechanism in 
this rent dissipation process to ensure vessels will be fully employed at the long-run competitive 
equilibrium; indeed, it is likely that capital will lie idle for some portion of the season.  The 
lower the barriers to entry (i.e. the lower are unavoidable fixed costs) the greater the tendency of 
vessels to enter the fishery at a given market price and thus the greater the amount of “idle 
capacity” within the system at equilibrium.   
  In summary, relative to optimal management, unfettered competition under open access 
will lead to excessive demand for fishing days.  Vessel owners will place too few passengers 
onboard each trip and the number of vessels will exceed the optimal level and almost assuredly 
engage in too few trips per season.  These vessels will be equipped with excessive catch 
augmenting capital given their number of passengers so that the harvest effectiveness of 
individual anglers is too high.  Distortionary spillovers from catch-augmenting inputs to non-
catch quality inputs are likely although the nature of this interaction is ultimately an empirical 
matter.  The proportion of catch that is landed will be too high (except where discards face full 
mortality) while the amount of landed catch will be further augmented by the distortions in the 
effectiveness of angler effort.  The overall consequences of these distortions are a reduced 
equilibrium biomass level, lowered rents for vessel owners and reduced total social surplus 
compared to the optimally managed case. 
Interestingly, some of the foregone rents under competition are accounted for via 
transfers from vessel owners to anglers.  Anglers do receive a greater number of days at sea and 
higher catch effectiveness (although not necessarily catch) in competitive bioeconomic 
                                                 
28 We are, of course, assuming away any problems associated with the integer nature of the number of vessels.   
  23equilibrium.  However, they also face lower stock levels which may counteract or even outweigh 
these benefits.  Furthermore, induced distortions in non-catch quality may tip the balance in 
favor of either regime without further empirical context for the model.  In other words, it is far 
from clear that consumers of charter and headboat services would be better off under a 
rationalized system without some redistribution of the rents.  This finding is of considerable 
importance for the political economy of the rationalization process and deserving of much more 
elaboration, both conceptually and empirically .   
 
IV. The “Optimal” Corrective Policy 
   To mimic the necessary conditions of the efficient outcome in the steady state a policy or 
set of policies must explicitly or implicitly levy the following corrective taxes (where we have 
substituted out for   using (7) and scaled taxes to logical units and levying periods):  
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  (29) 
  The first tax can be thought of as a “user fee” for access to for-hire recreational fishing 
and is presented at the resolution of an individual angler-day.  The optimal tax on days simply 
reflects the full mortality impact of the trip including both discards and landings.  It is 
noteworthy that the importance of harvest (and by implication the importance of stock size, 
angler density and catch-augmenting inputs) in determining  * D τ  declines for stocks with low 
discard mortality.  An interesting implication of this finding is that both the intensive and 
  24extensive margins of fishing mortality can be approximately controlled by a single post-trip levy 
on retained catch provided the survivability of discards is sufficiently high.   
  The tax on landings is denoted per angler-day and is proportional to the survivability of 
discards.  If all catch dies regardless of its disposition, then no regulatory control on landings is 
warranted and the tax on angler-days collapses to a fee on harvest.  This may be the case in many 
deepwater fisheries.   
  The instrument for angler density is envisioned as a per-head subsidy to be administered 
at the trip level for each vessel.  This subsidy increases at an increasing rate with the optimal 
density.  Furthermore, the subsidy per head goes to zero as the mortality of discards decreases.  If 
there is no catch mortality apart from landings then there is no external dynamic implication to a 
skipper’s choice of the number of passengers and the competitive market for angler days 
properly accounts for the remaining intra-vessel static externalities.   
  The taxes on catch-augmenting inputs are characterized as being levied on a seasonal 
basis per vessel (assuming that inputs are fixed over that horizon).  They increase in the 
effectiveness of the factor in fostering catch and, as with the subsidy on angler density, the input 
tax declines to zero as survivability of discards increases.  Without a direct dynamic externality 
from excess fishing power itself, mortality is controllable through a single levy on landings and 
the free market leads to the proper configuration of fishing inputs in long-run bioeconomic 
equilibrium.   
  The final tax is a seasonal levy per vessel that is designed to remove any rents available 
to the marginal entrant when evaluated at the optimal number of vessels.  This “permit” fee 
could also be administered through the selling or leasing of transferable rights to participate as a 
  25charter or headboat in the fishery.
29  Note that the rationale for this instrument is not the same as 
that underlying the entry tax in the classic, single-input fisheries literature.  This explanation has 
its root in the tendency of vessels in open access conditions to apply “effort” beyond the point 
that maximizes long-run resource rents.  The other taxes in (29) account for analogous forms of 
this behavior in a multidimensional sense.  The tax on entry in the current case is necessitated by 
a form of rent dissipation that arises due to the lack of cross-firm coordination in entry behavior 
under an external capacity constraint (the number of available fishing days).  Without such a tax, 
there will likely be an excess burden of fixed costs in the industry.      
  Although the conditions in (29) may suggest the necessity of imposing Q+4 corrective 
instruments to achieve optimal management, such is not the case.  The analysis of the prior 
section foreshadowed this by demonstrating that the complex distortions in catch quality inputs 
have their common origin in the fact that the competitive value of catch effectiveness reflected to 
vessel owners is excessive under open access.    
  Consider the outcome of an open access for-hire market, but with corrective taxes on 
landings, discards (both administered on a per-angler basis) and the number of vessels
30:  
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where the constraints in (7) are once again imposed.  It is a simple exercise in algebraic 
substitution to demonstrate that each of the implicit tax conditions in (29) is satisfied (so that the 
                                                 
29 The revenues from this instrument could be redistributed in a non-distortionary way back to industry or used to 
fund fishery research.  Furthermore, this tax can achieve the safe effect on entry incentives if it is levied on only the 
marginal entrant into the fishery (so that this entrant is indifferent between participating or not) – a method that may 
enjoy significant practical advantages over wide-scale recapturing of rents.   
30 We assume in (30) that anglers bear the direct incidence of landings and discard fees while the tax on vessels falls 
upon vessel owners.  Given the assumption of our theoretical model, alternative allocations will achieve the optimal 
equilibrium as well.  The following section relaxes this unrealistic view and considers the question of how the target 
of the tax may alter outcomes.     
  26regulated steady state competitive market mimics the optimal solution) as long as the fees are set 
as follows:  
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Note that the Q+3 implicit taxes directed at inputs, angler density, landings and angler days are 
subsumed within two instruments on the level of discarded and retained catch.  By targeting 
discard mortality (and, by extension, harvest), a single properly calibrated instrument is able to 
induce the optimal configuration of inputs.  Furthermore, the combined fees on landings and 
discards cause fishermen to face (either directly through taxes or permit fees or indirectly 
through increased trip costs) the full dynamic cost of their fishing mortality when contemplating 
whether to make a trip.  
  As noted previously, the magnitude of fishing induced mortality is critical.  Fisheries 
with either very high or low survivability rates of discards may be able to operate effectively 
under a single fishing mortality instrument.  This potential for policy simplification is especially 
interesting given that survivability may itself be within the control of policymakers.  For 
instance, it may be possible to institute relatively low-cost and easily-monitored standards for the 
handling and quick release of discards such that their mortality approaches zero.  This would 
allow fishing mortality to be controlled by a single dockside fee on landings and could also foster 
considerable savings in monitoring, enforcement and administrative costs.  This is especially 
important given the likely difficulties in monitoring and enforcing instruments focused on 
discards rather than those based on landings.  Of course some deepwater fisheries will have 
inherently high mortality rates so that the distinction between the appropriate discard and 
  27landings taxes becomes negligible ( L L H τ τ φ = = − 1 ) and can be viewed instead as a composite 
“harvest” tax.  It may, therefore, be desirous in such fisheries to divert limited monitoring and 
enforcement resources away from dockside to on-vessel efforts (such as human observers or 
electronic surveillance systems with random audits) to ensure that the full cost of harvest 
mortality is enforced.   
  
V. Some Practical Considerations 
  The previous section deduced a number of properties of an efficiently managed 
recreational sector.  We showed that efficiency could be achieved by using an extensive “price-
based” incentive system that taxed or subsidized all relevant inputs in order to convey the correct 
signals to decision makers (both anglers and vessel owners) about the impacts of inputs on 
fishing mortality.
31  We showed that a parsimonious price-based system may also be used that 
directly alters the price of the two principle determinants of fishing mortality, namely discard 
and landings mortality.  As we showed, mortality from both sources can be controlled either 
indirectly (by taxing all relevant inputs) or directly.  This mirrors a common finding in the 
environmental economics literature, namely that pollution can be efficiently controlled by 
altering the prices of all inputs according to their marginal contribution to pollution, or by 
targeting pollution directly.   A difference between our problem and pollution problems is that an 
additional instrument on entry is required to avoid open access dissipation of rents, even with 
corrective taxes on inputs or outputs. 
                                                 
31 The implication of (29) is not that all the listed taxes/subsidies be explicitly levied.  Doing so would result in 
redundant “double taxation” in one case.  Specifically, given a tax on landings and all of the inputs of the harvest 
function, a separate tax on fishing days is not needed.  Nonetheless, Q+3 other inputs do require directed treatment.    
  28  Our findings to this point, while useful, raise important practical issues that are likely to 
arise in real-world fisheries.  In particular they raise questions about regulatory design when the 
simplifying assumptions (complete certainty, homogeneity of anglers, absence of strategic 
behavior, etc.) fail to hold.  We address some of these practical concerns in the context of two 
questions.  First, who should bear the direct incidence of the landings and harvest taxes?  
Second, could catch effectiveness or its inputs be targeted by regulators instead of harvest? 
 
V.1 Who Pays the Landings and Discard Taxes? 
  The previous section did not consider who bears the direct cost of the landings and 
discard taxes (or, equivalently, the extent of the market for discard and landings quotas).  Indeed, 
in a model of perfect competition, complete and symmetric information and zero monitoring 
costs the direct incidence simply doesn’t matter for efficiency.  However, as Coase made 
abundantly clear, the assignment of rights in a world characterized by significant transactions 
costs is often of the utmost importance.    
In the case of the landings fee, it appears sensible for anglers to directly bear the burden 
rather than vessels.  First, a landings tax borne by for-hire vessel owners does not guarantee the 
proper behavioral response from customers since landings are individually chosen (assuming of 
course that they are not constrained by harvest).  If monitoring and enforcement costs were 
sufficiently small, vessels would directly pass on their landings charge to anglers according to 
their individual landings, thus preserving the optimality of landings decisions.  However, the 
costs of doing so in practice may be significant and one might anticipate instead that vessel 
owners would recoup their anticipated per-angler landings costs by an equivalent increase in the 
price of a trip.  While the combination of this increase with a discard tax would send the proper 
  29marginal signal to fishermen in terms of the implicit tax on fishing days, it would fail to provide 
an effective check on their landings behavior since it is determined on an ex-ante basis.  In the 
end, we would expect an equilibrium where landings exceed the level predicted by the optimal 
management model as well as a greater number of days at sea than prescribed under optimal 
management since demand would be shifted to the right relative to a scenario where landings are 
effectively constrained.    
A second rationale for the direct imposition of landings fees on anglers is that it is robust 
to angler heterogeneity in landings preferences.  Although we presumed identical preferences in 
our previous derivations, the results are easily generalized to allow for angler heterogeneity in a 
number of factors, including preferences for retaining catch and exogenous skill in capturing 
fish.  It is simple to demonstrate that as long as this heterogeneity is accounted for in the 
derivation of SS λ , the tax or quota system derived above allows each angler to retain catch 
according to their particular preferences while still doing so in an optimal matter.
32  “High 
retention” types retain a greater proportion of their catch than do “catch and release” types yet 
everyone pays the full social cost of the resulting mortality.  Barring the existence of a perfect 
pass-through market for landings on vessels, the imposition of a landings penalty on vessel 
owners is unlikely to generate such an efficient distribution of landings across anglers.  For 
instance, in an attempt to moderate expenditures on landings fees, vessels may establish blanket 
landings standards for all passengers.  Such a system, while easy to monitor and enforce, will 
likely generate considerable inefficiencies and distributional issues by doing little to constrain 
                                                 
32 This does not imply that regulators must perfectly observe individual heterogeneity; rather, they must possess 
knowledge of the distribution of heterogeneity in the population of anglers.   
  30the landings of low retention types of fishermen at the expense of “meat hunting” high retention 
types.
33    
In the case of a tariff or quota on discards, the case for anglers bearing the burden seems 
less compelling.  After all, per-angler harvest (the portion of the discard identity of harvest minus 
landings that is not controlled by an external instrument) in our model is an outcome of vessel 
owners’ decisions, not anglers’.  If all anglers utilize homogeneous gear provided by the vessel 
owner and fish equally assiduously, then there seems to be no efficiency gain from levying 
discard taxes on anglers.  This observation is robust to the presence of exogenous variation in 
angler skill that makes certain fishermen more effective at catching fish than others, as harvest in 
this case remains predetermined from the perspective of the angler.  However, the introduction of 
variable angler “effort” into the model (possibly combined with heterogeneity in the intensity of 
harvest preferences across anglers) clearly changes matters.
34  The argument parallels that 
employed for landings and hinge upon the ability of direct levies on anglers to influence their 
behavior in an efficient way that is encompassing of heterogeneity.  Barring the low-cost 
development of a perfect pass-through market for discard fees on vessels, the direct levying of 
discard penalties is likely to have superior efficiency properties, although there may be 
compelling political deterrents to the establishment of such a system.
35
  
                                                 
33 A further advantage of individually-levied landings taxes or quotas is that they are robust to the sort of between-
angler trading or purchasing of catch that is often experienced on vessels (but not explicitly modeled here) as long as 
the fees are levied at the dock after all trades have occurred.  In this system fish will flow to those anglers with the 
highest willingness-to-pay and these fishermen will in turn face the full user cost of their retention decisions.   
34 Harvest is not likely to be purely predetermined from the viewpoint of individual anglers.  Although key decisions 
affecting harvest are made at the vessel level (fishing location, angler density, etc.) there may be a number of 
behavioral “degrees of freedom” open to anglers.  For instance, anglers may be able to supply some or all of their 
own gear, thus potentially increasing their harvest rate.   
35 Landings fees are likely to enjoy considerable political advantages over discard or catch fees given the likelihood 
that fishermen may view the ability to freely catch and release fish as a “natural right” whereas a charge for the 
retention of catch may seem more natural due to the fact that retention is consumptive in a more traditional, 
immediately tangible sense.   
  31V.2 Could Controls on Catch Effectiveness or its Inputs be Employed Instead of Discard Fees? 
  Since the choices of vessel owners are the only determinants of harvest rates in our 
simple model, one might logically infer that a tax on catch effectiveness (i.e. a tax on some index 
of a vessel’s productivity), if it could be reliably measured, would prove equivalent to a discard 
tax.  This is not generally the case, however, as we shall see.   
  First of all, if we derive the optimal tax on q from a revision of (30) where the discard tax 
is simply replaced by a catch effectiveness tax ( q SS q H φ λ τ = ), we find that some of the necessary 
implicit tariffs listed in (29) fail to hold for all functional relationships between catch 
effectiveness and harvest.  Specifically, the first condition in (29) fails to hold except for the case 
where the following condition is satisfied:  
  ( ) 0 , , > ∀ = q q X H q H q .  (32)
In other words, the harvest function must be linear in catch effectiveness.  This is a 
commonplace assumption, but if this condition fails then the implicit tax on trips is:
36  
  ( ) q H L q SS D φ φ λ τ + − = ) 1 ( * .  (33)
If  for all q (i.e. harvest is strictly convex in q), then the implicit tax on days is too high 
relative to that prescribed at the optimal solution, driving trip demand to too low a level – this 
despite the fact that catch-augmenting inputs are all optimally determined.
H q H q >
37    The imposition of 
a linear tariff on catch effectiveness fails to work in general for the reason that a non-linear tariff 
is required to account for the harvest-related mortality from additional fishing trips.  A corrective 
tax or subsidy on fishing days is required in combination with the tariff on catch effectiveness to 
achieve the same outcome as the single levy on discards.   
                                                 
36 Note that the tax on landings from (30) has been altered to  SS λ φ) 1 ( −  to compensate for the now-missing 
“subsidy” on landings implicit in the discard tax but missing in the catch effectiveness tax.   
37 The reverse applies for the case where harvest is strictly concave in catch effectiveness. 
  32  There are other practical reasons for avoiding taxation of catch effectiveness.  First of all, 
the very nature of catch effectiveness is that it is difficult to measure, being composed of 
numerous inputs that are not easily observed by regulators.  Furthermore, if such an index were 
established and taxes implemented in a manner based upon this index, then there would be an 
obvious incentive on the part of vessel owners to innovate so as to increase the effective catching 
power obtained for any value of the index.  Finally, if harvest is in anyway malleable with 
respect to the decisions of anglers, then levies on catch effectiveness (or any input-targeted 
instrument) will leave these endogenous sources of mortality unchecked – a criticism that does 
not apply to a direct discard fee on anglers.   
  Rather than penalize catch effectiveness, per se, one could instead consider quantity 
restrictions on key inputs in the harvest process.  However, such an approach suffers from all the 
prior criticisms of levies on catch effectiveness and is likely to face additional shortcomings as 
well.  For instance, a restriction on the number of lines allowed per angler will increase the 
“virtual price” of this input (Neary and Roberts, 1980, Squires, 1994) leading to attempts by 
vessel owners to substitute away from the regulated input into non-regulated inputs.  Barring a 
perfectly complementary relationship between the input and catch effectiveness, this attempt will 
succeed to some degree.
38  The possibilities for such substitution may be considerable and little 
understood on an a priori basis.  Accordingly, barring an omnipotent knowledge of the 
production technology and factor costs faced by fishermen, regulators are likely to see their 
attempts to reign in catch effectiveness frustrated.  The dynamic manifestation of this process 
may be a sequential game of “cat and mouse” between regulators and vessel owners – a pattern 
                                                 
38A restriction on fishing lines per angler may lead to the use of higher quality bait, increased chumming of the 
waters, more powerful vessels to maximize fishing time or even a countervailing reduction in the density of 
fishermen to enhance per-angler catch.   
  33of behavior that can be observed in the histories of numerous managed commercial fisheries 
(Wilen, 2006).     
 
VI. Conclusion 
  The adoption of market-based rationalization programs in commercial fisheries has been 
met by a great deal of success.  Fisheries that once were compressed into short and intense 
“derbies” with excessive numbers of highly capitalized vessels are now conducted at slower 
paces that allow fishermen to maximize the value of catch rather than its volume.  New rents 
have been generated both by producing higher valued products and by reducing excess inputs 
and reconfiguring production.  Rights based systems such as ITQs give fishermen a stake in the 
health of the fishery, reducing the adversarial nature of fisheries regulation and management and 
generating stewardship incentives among participants.  A question arising from these success 
stories is whether these same outcomes might be generated with similar programs in recreational 
fisheries.  Currently the answer is not clear as there is no analogous body of experience for 
recreational fisheries.  
In the absence of empirical experience, the alternative we pursue is to develop a 
conceptual structure with which to forecast the potential sources of rent dissipation in for-hire 
recreational fisheries and to gauge the likely consequences of various rationalization strategies.  
An important innovation in our approach is the detailed integration of the motivations and 
choices of the for-hire recreational sector within a traditional bioeconomic framework.  Previous 
analyses of recreational fishing have focused on angler decision making without giving heed to 
the role of the suppliers of recreational trips.  But understanding this supply behavior is essential 
to discovering how rents are dissipated and how, after rationalization, rents may be generated 
  34under new incentives.  Importantly, we find that open access rent dissipation in the for-hire 
recreational sector operates in a manner subtly different from that in the commercial sector.  In 
commercial fisheries, there is a direct link between harvest and revenue that motivates each 
vessel owner to increase fishing capacity in the drive to increase his/her share of the aggregate 
catch.  In the recreational sector, vessel owners instead produce a multidimensional recreational 
service rather than mere harvest, although harvest and landings are obviously important drivers 
of the market for recreational trips.  Vessel owners do not simply purchase more catch-producing 
inputs as in the commercial sector; instead, they offer recreational trips with various 
characteristics and prices, and anglers operate in the market to choose a recreational provider and 
number of trips according to utility maximization.  It is the subtle interaction of angler 
preferences with open access competition among suppliers that leads to our predictions of rent 
dissipation, distorted inputs and excessive harvest and landings. 
Efficient rationalization requires that the full mortality from discards and landings be 
incorporated within the institutional design.  When the proportion of discard mortality lies 
between zero and one, it is necessary to induce both anglers and vessel owners in the for-hire 
sector to correctly account for their respective roles in influencing total fishing mortality.  A 
useful and potentially policy-relevant result is that if both forms of mortality are appropriately 
priced, this induces efficient choices of all other fishing inputs, except the size of the fleet.  A 
corollary is that with discard mortality, an efficient ITQ program must ideally have transferable 
permits for both discards and landings.  However, if discard mortality lies at the extremes of the 
spectrum then a single mortality instrument will suffice.  For example, if discard mortality is 
close to zero, an ITQ program on landings will be sufficient.  Similarly, if the target is a high 
quality food species and anglers are strongly motivated by “putting food on the table”, then 
  35landings are likely constrained by harvest so that only landing rights need to be traded 
(regardless of the mortality of discards for the species).  These are fortunate situations from a 
management perspective because measuring landings at the dock is always easier than 
attempting to measure at sea discards.  However, as discard mortality increases, so does the user 
cost of discards and so managers must increasingly focus their efforts on curtailing discards.  
This is especially important where a fish is primarily targeted for sport so that landings represent 
only small portion of total mortality.  This is a very problematic situation that poses monitoring, 
measurement and enforcement difficulties that are yet to be solved in many long-standing 
commercial fisheries with significant discard mortality.  
Although we have focused our attention on theoretically optimal policies in this paper, 
our framework is nevertheless quite useful in addressing the strengths and shortcomings of more 
limited and cost-conscious rationalization policies.  For example, in lieu of the three-part tax (or 
quota) we have prescribed above, regulators could instead fix total angler days and allow vessel 
owners to purchase the rights to service these angler days in a quota market.
39  Such an approach 
is easily monitored and enforced and derives some clout from the first condition in (29) that 
shows how a properly calculated quota is capable of providing efficient incentives for anglers in 
determining the extensive margin of their fishing mortality.  However, when applied exclusively 
without regard to the discards or landings associated with individual trips (the intensive margins 
of mortality), this policy will induce numerous slippages in per-angler landings, catch-
augmenting and (possibly) quality-augmenting inputs, anglers per vessel and the equilibrium 
fleet size.  The message of our modeling is that there are multiple margins across which rents 
may be dissipated in recreational fisheries.  When a policy is targeted at only a subset of these 
                                                 
39 Such a scheme is not a theoretical curiosity.  A similar scheme has been in place in the New England commercial 
groundfish fisheries for several years to control fishing mortality after other methods were attempted and judged as 
failures.   
  36margins, perverse incentives will often persist with respect to unconstrained inputs, a lesson that 
has been repeatedly borne out (if not always heeded) for commercial fisheries as well. 
These observations only scratch the surface of the numerous issues involved in thinking 
about the rationalization of recreational sectors.  While there are some similarities between the 
for-hire recreational and commercial cases, there remain significant differences that warrant 
further conceptual and empirical investigation.   
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